



Psychosis, Neurosis, Perversion

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Barthes said to me the other day: basically, when you give someone something to read, you give it to your mother.

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I.

Psycho is undoubtedly the most obscure of Hitchcock's films. Obscure, first of all, in a literal sense, because in none of his other films does night seem so black and day so somber. There is, of course, *The Wrong Man*: exactly like *Psycho* (inscribed between the colorful symphonies of *North by Northwest* and *The Birds*), it left a trail of shadow, three years earlier, between *The Man Who Knew Too Much* and *Vertigo*. The two films do have in common a kind of nocturnal excellence which permeates the gestures, faces and image tones: Hitchcock sought, in one case, to endow them with documentary value, and entrusted them, in the other case, to a television cameraman. However, this material obscurity—fuller and duller in the realism of *The Wrong Man*—seemed eventually to dissolve away, or at least be balanced out by the exemplary linearity of the screenplay and by the ultimate resolution of the error, restoring to Christopher Balestrero the certainty of his identity, and to his wife the hope of a fragile mental balance. In *Psycho*, on the contrary, to the extent that a surrender to the codifications of romanticism and horror is always possible, the role of shadow grows incessantly, according to the interplay of ordering and disruption that guides the film from its beginning to its end.

The principle of classical film is well known: the end must reply to the beginning; between one and the other something must be set in order; the last scene frequently recalls the first and constitutes its resolution. *Psycho*'s opaqueness is contradictory in this respect: the end, apparently, in no way replies to the beginning: the psychiatrist's commentary on the case of Norman Bates has little to do with the love scene between Marion and Sam in the Phoenix hotel. The specific obscurity of *Psycho* is thus, above all, a rhetorical obscurity. It denotes the fact that the film, in a sense, contravenes the classical model of

106 narrative—as well as that more singular model which is both an eccentric and exemplary version of it: the Hitchcockian system. Obviously, it does so not in order to elude the system, but rather—through a greater degree of abstraction—to determine its regime(s): the system here performs displacements with respect to itself, designating with extreme clarity the mechanisms that govern its operation.

II.

The first sign of this is the radical displacement of the investigation. In the Hitchcockian fable, investigations conform to two major modalities, complementary and interchangeable, in which the relationships of identification are established by the position of knowledge that Hitchcock reserves for himself (and thus for the spectator as well), as opposed to the various subjects (supports) of the fiction. The inquiry represents, first of all, an ideal testing-ground for the hero (or the heroine as mirror-image, or the couple-as-subject), who, constrained by chance and necessity, learns to acknowledge a certain truth about his own desire after a dramaturgy of violence based on the search for the secret. To achieve this the riddle must be solved, and the mistaken identity in which it was cloaked revealed; these two questions may then be traced back to their common origin, resulting in a final equilibrium between desire and the law. This renders possible, through the inclusion-exclusion process of the terms of the destructive drive, the ultimate integration (whether successful or not) of the imaginary into the symbolic by means of a general dovetailing of the textual operations. Such is the exemplary itinerary of *North by Northwest*, but the same model is used in *The Thirty-nine Steps*, *Saboteur*, *Foreign Correspondent*, *To Catch a Thief*, and, in a slightly different form, in *Strangers on a Train* and *Rear Window*. In *Notorious*, by displacement, it is the hero, the man of the couple, who is the secret agent invested with the knowledge and initiative usually paradoxically divided up between the police and the false culprit. In *Spellbound*, of the two characters which make up the couple, it is the woman who leads the investigation of which the other is the object. And in *Shadow of a Doubt* the investigation is led by both the woman and the policeman, who eventually make up the final couple. Thus, most of Hitchcock's films can be seen as multiple variations or distortions of this same basic model.

Conversely, the second modality consists of denying the hero (or heroine or couple-subject access to the truth of the investigation: even though they may share its diegetic benefits, they are dispossessed of this knowledge by some external factor. Take, for example, *Dial M for Murder*, in which neither the husband nor the wife lead the investiga-

tion of which both are the object; or *Under Capricorn*, whose highly improbable plot follows the same model; or even *I Confess*, in which the presumed culprit is, paradoxically, the only one who knows the secret, but can say nothing. However, these narratives in which the hero is deprived of the truth-seeking initiative are, in general, all the more constrained by a uniform dynamic leading from the riddle to its solution (*The Wrong Man*, for example). In addition, they often depend, very naturally, alongside the main couple, on a third important character: in *Under Capricorn*, Charles Adare, the outsider and friend; in *Dial M for Murder*, the Chief Inspector Hubbard, who unravels all the elaborately tangled threads of the plot.

Psycho, however, apparently conforms to this second model, while breaking the system apart at its very core. Neither of the two main characters is invested as subject during the progression of the investigation; its indices of truth are divided up among Arbogast, the sheriff, Sam, Lila and the psychiatrist. The former two, a private detective and a policeman, share the partial and misleading truth that is so often allotted them in Hitchcock's films: Arbogast succeeds in tracing Marion but gives credit to the fiction of the mother; the sheriff denies this fiction without being able to account for its effects. Sam and Lila, for their part, seem to fulfill—amidst the scattered functions of the second model—a function proper to the first, that of the couple whose action solves the riddle and opens the way to truth. This is actually due to a displacement, since the solution brings about nothing that concerns them directly (thus Sam and Lila merely mimic the diegetic couple, marking out its absence). In addition—and as a result—their solution is only a half-truth; it immediately requires the mediation of a superior truth. This is provided by the third important character, here embodied in the psychiatrist, with the significant difference that in this case he intervenes, very deliberately, as *deus ex machina*, a stranger to the action, strictly exterior to what is at stake. This is why the final explanation has sometimes been considered a useless appendix, whereas it is the ultimate result of the work of displacement that has taken place throughout the film. Thus, from an original dispersion of truth and its diegetic effects, a veritable split occurs between the materiality and the awareness of experience: the division of the investigation merely reproduces the central division organizing the film and determining, at all levels, its regime.

III.

Psycho contains two narratives, slipping one under the other, one into the other. This relationship must be conceptualized in order to

108 penetrate to a structural perversion to which Hitchcock opened the way by deciding to “kill the star in the first third of the film.”¹ There is, first of all, the story of Marion. The opening scene in the hotel room calls attention to the problematic: marriage; the ensuing theft produces its dramatic effect. This is a weakened version both of *Strangers on a Train* (as regards marriage, Marion and Sam occupying the place of Guy Haines and Ann Morton, with the third person being a first wife, not yet divorced in *Strangers*, already divorced in *Psycho*) and of *Marnie* (as regards the theft). The story could have various outcomes along its own axis: one of these, the meeting between Marion and Norman, has the ambiguous function of ending the story in order to transform it. The second story, that of Norman, might thus be said to begin when Marion arrives at the motel and to continue, slightly altered (because of the persistent pressure of the first story), to the end of the film. Such, indeed, was the case in the novel by Robert Bloch used as a pretext for the film: Hitchcock immediately broke up the overly-simple structure of the book, and later justified this in a singularly underdetermined way.²

In fact, the first part of the story was a red herring. That was deliberate, you see, to detract the viewer’s attention in order to heighten the murder. We purposely made that beginning on the long side, with the bit about the theft and her escape, in order to get the audience absorbed with the question of whether she would or would not be caught. Even that business about the forty thousand dollars was milked to the very end so that the public might wonder what’s going to happen to the money

The more we go into the details of the girl’s journey, the more the audience becomes absorbed in her flight. That’s why so much is made of the motorcycle cop and the change of cars. When Anthony Perkins tells the girl of his life in the motel, and they exchange views, you still play upon the girl’s problem. It seems as if she’s decided to go back to Phoenix and give the money back, and it’s possible that the public anticipates by thinking, “Ah, this young man is influencing her to change her mind.” You turn the viewer in one direction and then in another; you keep him as far as possible from what’s actually going to happen.³

This statement focuses on what constitutes, properly speaking, the center of the narrative, its moment of extreme fascination. However, it denies the fact that, from this very moment onwards, the constitution of the “first story” is supported by its inscription within the “second,” both at the level of narrative identifications and at that of the logic of its occurrences. Denied, too, is the subtle movement by which the narrative both masks and accentuates the division constituting its paradoxical-

cal unity. The singular genius of the film consists of indissolubly mixing together the two narratives that it is composed of by using the meeting of the two characters as the means of their substitution.

Everything contributes to this.

1. The time allotted to the meeting, which by itself takes up, strictly speaking, one-fifth of the film (more, in fact: a third, counting the rather short sequence that leads Marion, caught in the storm, to the Bates Motel, and the much longer sequence between the murder and the disappearance of Marion's car in the marsh).

2. The violence that concludes the meeting, which is so incredible that it obfuscates its own secondary effect: namely, the determining fact of the passage, in a sense, from one character to the other.

3. A major rhetorical shift contributes to this displacement and facilitates the reversal. Whereas the segmentation of the rest of the film systematically employs, in a highly classical manner, the three criteria of segmental demarcation,⁴ the scene of the meeting (in the extended sense) is devoid of all punctuation: there is not a single fade-out between the moment Marion abruptly leaves the garage where she has traded in her car and the moment her new car sinks into the marsh. This does not mean that 35 minutes of the film make up a single segment; the two other criteria of demarcation do intervene, although much less distinctly than in most classical films. It is as though the sudden absence of punctuation were responsible for creating the illusion of segmental continuity, isolating the time of the meeting within the construction of a whole in order to give it a greater fluidity and the logical evidence necessary to carry out the substitutive shift.

4. Finally, "naturalness" acts like the musicality of a fiction, integrating with misleading obviousness the elements of the first narrative which contribute to the construction of the second.

IV.

The perfection of the ternary composition both conceals and reveals the binary division between the narratives and the characters. Three movements, reiterated to harmonize term-to-term in coupled oppositions, reinforce the unfolding of the fiction and its organic cohesion by establishing a very stable hierarchy of repetition and difference. All three involve an itinerary leading to the motel, and all three end in a murderous aggression punctuated by strident music. The first takes Marion Crane from her room in Phoenix to the motel room, where she is assassinated by "the mother"; the second takes Arbogast from Sam's store in Fairvale to the motel and then to Norman's house, where he in turn is assassinated by "the mother"; the third takes Sam

110 and Lila from Sam's store to the motel and then to Norman's house, where Lila only escapes aggression by "the mother" thanks to the intervention of Sam, who recognizes Norman through the disguise.

It is immediately clear, limiting the discussion at first to murder, what movements 2 and 3, 1 and 2 have in common, respectively and by pairs: the aggression is a response, in the two latter cases, to an intrusion into the house, first by Arbogast, then by Sam and Lila (whereas Marion's assassination takes place at the motel); but—conversely—in the first two cases the murder is accomplished, whereas its failure in the third case lifts the veil of mystery and carries the film to its resolution. Thus, with the benefit of an equivalence by pairs ($1=2$, $2=3$), the third movement recalls the first, thus accentuating the repetitive circulation.

Nevertheless, on closer examination it can be seen that an intrusion into the house is suggested during the first movement, though in unlike manner, when Norman invites Marion to share his meal, provoking the indignation of "the mother" and, eventually, the murder and everything that ensues. Thus, by a regulated difference, the circularity of the fiction is ensured—what might be called its narrative (dis)similarity. In the same way, just as movements 1 and 3 are organized around the repeated motif of the rooms rented first by Marion, then by Sam and Lila, the second movement includes Norman's very natural proposal of his room to Arbogast (and later, failing that, his less natural proposal that Arbogast come and help him change the beds).

Again, one could evoke the three scenes of shot-reverse shot, identically distributed throughout the three movements, in the small motel office (with Norman on one side of the counter, Marion, Arbogast, Sam and Lila on the other, reflected in the mirror). However, in the third case, there is a repetition: Sam is later seen alone with Norman in the office (while Lila is on her way up to the house). Thus, the third movement constantly doubles back on itself to emphasize, within the regulated difference, the progression and accomplishment of the narrative. It has been seen that movements 2 and 3 are defined by an identical trajectory: from Sam's store to the motel and then to the house. However, in the third movement this trajectory is split in two by the emergence of the mystery, which constitutes a turning-point.⁵ When Sam goes to the motel the first time to look for Arbogast, he sees "the mother." He undertakes the same visit with Lila in order to initiate her fully into the secret; thus they follow, together, the whole itinerary leading from their rented room to Marion's, and then, separately, from Norman's office to the mother's room, and from Norman's boyhood room to the cellar where his mother is concealed. The (dis)similarity ensures the circular identity of the narrative by guaranteeing its unpredictable advance toward a final result.

Within this regulated succession, this elaborate interplay of identities, separations, intimations and revelations that correlatively ensure the superimposition and interchangeability of the two narratives, the second movement, much shorter than the first, has a specific transitive value: following Marion's disappearance, it emphasizes the role of Norman, progressively establishing him as the new hero of the narrative before making him the center of the mystery. The latter is accomplished by the third movement, for which Hitchcock cleverly reserves the sheriff's revelation concerning the mother's death—since, logically, if Sam and Lila were only preoccupied with Marion's fate and the stolen money, the spectator could only expect, and dread, the solution of the undoubtedly horrendous mystery hidden within Norman.

V.

This circular orchestration, by the very progression of its three movements, has a secondary effect: it sets off all the more plainly the segments bordering it on either side (the opening and closing scenes), and, within these segments, rigorously heterogeneous and yet connected, the speech of the psychiatrist and the love scene in the Phoenix hotel.

The speech of the psychiatrist, in the course of which those parts of the mystery still remaining obscure are finally illuminated, is the logical consequence of the radical exclusion of the first narrative. The speech concerns Norman; it is a commentary and explanation of his case: it says nothing about Marion, who has become the pure object of a murderous desire, and even less about Sam, who can only listen, at Lila's side, to an analysis that excludes him from the diegesis of which he too, through Marion, had been the subject.

This raises a series of questions. Why is this film about psychotic dissociation organized with respect to an original plot which, while supporting it to the point of appearing indispensable, nevertheless remains, in a sense, totally foreign to it? In this highly classically orchestrated film, whose three movements recall the hermeneutic tripartition of *North by Northwest*, how is the internal principle of classical film satisfied—namely, that the end must always reply to the beginning? In what way does the last scene provide a solution, or even an echo, to the first? I think it is necessary, here, to conceive of Hitchcock as pursuing, through fiction, an indirect reflection on the inevitable relationship, in his art and in his society, between psychosis and neurosis, inscribed respectively in narrative terms as murder and theft. These are general instances, fictional rather than clinical, those of a civilization in which a certain subject, who is both a singular subject

112 and the collective agent of enunciation, finds a way to structure his phantasy and determine his symbolic regime. What appears from the fact that the subject of neurosis is offered up in the logic of the narrative to the violence of the subject of psychosis, man or woman, mutually interchangeable throughout the course of the narrative, is the obscure numinous point of a fiction which carries to a vertiginous degree of duplication the fascinated reflection on the logic of desire.

This position is a familiar one within the twists and turns of Hitchcock's labyrinthian scenarios. It is already enunciated with incredible precision in *Shadow of a Doubt* by the doubling of uncle and niece, manifested in the Christian name they share as well as in the repeated motif of the bedrooms (the uncle's hotel room and the niece's family room: both characters are revealed, lying in bed, by a single movement of the camera, and, in a pure mirror-effect, there appears in the first shot, from the left, the woman who runs the hotel, and in the second, from the right, the young girl's father; thus is prepared the substitution that will later place the uncle in the niece's room). On the one hand, there is Charlie's—the niece's—profound, inexpressible dissatisfaction, the neurotic lack which she hopes will magically disappear thanks to Uncle Charlie; on the other, there is the uncle's psychotic split, the return of his childhood trauma that is compulsively acted out in the murder of widows, and that ultimately, due to the progression of the inquiry, turns upon the young girl as the logical object of its deadly desire. Thus, as in *Psycho*, woman, the subject of neurosis, becomes the object of the psychosis of which man is the subject. This is a fundamental aspect of the Hitchcockian constant according to which, given a certain order of desire, it is above all women that get killed.

This is not to say:

1. That women do not kill. But the murder they commit is always the reverse side of the "psychotic" aggression of which they are the object. It is thus that, in *Shadow of a Doubt*, the uncle, in his struggle, falls off the train from which he had tried to throw his niece; in *Blackmail* the young woman kills the painter who had tried to rape her; and in *Dial M for Murder*, the husband's murderous desire having replaced, as in so many of Hitchcock's and other films, the psychosis he conceals, the woman kills to defend herself from the assassin he has hired. This is why, in a rigorously complementary manner, women may—or must—seem in the position of symbolic murderers: thus, in *North by Northwest*, Eve's fictitious murder of Thornhill is woman's response to the murderous desire she awakens in man—if only metaphorically, as a sexual object.

2. That women cannot "manifest psychotic tendencies" (as can be seen in *The Wrong Man* or in *Under Capricorn*). But that they do so

only to the extent that the hero has suffered a loss of identity, and never from the same demented object-desire as he. This is why women can only tolerate madness in men if they can save them from it (*Spellbound*: even at the cost of awakening their murderous desire; or, in a totally different way, *Rebecca*). This modality may also be that of men (*Marnie*), but it then involves only, so to speak, a semi-madness, and this at the price of a fetishistic position that reinforces love and is related, through scopophilia, to murderous desire, of which it is the mitigated, possessive form.

Vertigo constitutes, in all respects, a marvelously complex counter-example. The woman is the object of an illusory psychosis; she is an image of psychosis, turned toward death in a twofold manner, through the image-painting of Carlotta Valdes. She awakens a passion in the man: the desire to see, mesmerized by death; this is the moment when Scottie tears Madeleine away from what fascinates him. Later, after the false-real death of Madeleine, the man wanders on the borderline of madness (between neurosis and psychosis: narcissistic neurosis, mourning and melancholia). Still later, when the false living woman reappears, the desire to kill re-emerges: an image must be modeled so that the "real" can at last be transferred onto it, thus accomplishing—with the help of God if necessary (the appearance of the nun diegetically motivating the second fall)—the subject's desire, sublimated in the scopoc drive that transfixes the male subject.

3. Finally, this is not to say that men cannot be the subject of neurosis. Such, indeed, is their most common lot. Neurosis is what occurs when an encounter with the extraordinary, by way of the inevitable ritual testing of murder-psychosis, determines for the hero the resolution of the symbolic. There is always a "madman" who kills for the hero, turning the subject of neurosis into a false culprit, and thus inciting him—through a displacement in which neurotic guilt is resolved in the reality of action—to rediscover a certain truth of his desire. Here again, the itinerary of *North by Northwest* is exemplary.

So, in another manner, is that of *Strangers on a Train*, through the meeting of the characters and the fiction of the exchanged murders. The issue of marriage, or in this case remarriage (elsewhere it is the question of stabilizing or restabilizing the couple: *Suspicion*, *The Man Who Knew Too Much*) serves to sustain what can be called Guy's "neurosis": the basic neurosis of American cinema. By a diabolical twist, this issue—in the interests of its own resolution (the final marriage)—provides psychosis with its object. Because of the exchange of murders, Miriam, Guy's wife, comes to occupy the place of Bruno's father, whom Bruno has vainly appealed to Guy to murder. As a part of the phantasy of the murder of the father, necessary to the symbolic resolution of

114 neurosis, Miriam thus embodies the complementary phantasy that indicates, for Hitchcock, the psychotic's access to the real: the murder of a woman (and through her, of the too-well-loved mother; such films as *Shadow of a Doubt*, *Strangers on a Train* and *Frenzy* are directly connected around this motif).

These, then, are the terms that *Psycho* sets into play, frontally, through a reversible effect of the articulation between the two psychic structures, grasped in a doubling relationship carried by sexual difference. The criterion used here to associate and dissociate neurosis and psychosis remains, overwhelmingly, the one used by Freud:⁶ both are avatars of desire which bring about an unsettling of the subject's relationship to reality. But whereas in psychosis the Ego is at the service of the Id and eludes what it finds intolerable in reality, in neurosis the Ego is the stage of a conflict between the Id and the Superego, such that the loss of reality "affects precisely that piece of reality as a result of whose demands the instinctual repression ensued."⁷ This is Marion's situation in *Psycho*: the theft which draws her into this loss is her response to the socio-sexual aggression on the part of the "millionaire" in Cassidy's office, of which she was, metaphorically, the object. But on a much deeper level, it is her response to Sam's aggression, of which she feels herself to be the object, in the sordid clandestineness of the hotel room, when the conflict between the intensity of her sexual demand and her wish to have it legally sanctioned by marriage (continually postponed due to Sam's financial position) comes to a head.⁸ This explains the focus, just as later on in *Marnie*, on money, that polyvalent signifier of desire (sexual or social) which also serves, even better than hysterical conversion and perhaps with greater conformity to unconscious logic, the logic of the fiction.⁹ This is what Marion's theft attempts to resolve, magically, "by a sort of flight," as Freud says of neurosis, dodging the fragment of reality that psychosis, for its part, simply denies in order to reconstruct a better reality.

VI.

The long segment during which Marion and Norman are face to face in the small reception room of the motel thus places face to face, fictitiously, two psychic structures: man and woman, the latter destined to become the prey of the former. The mirror arrangement that organizes their dialogue in a regulated alternation of shot-reverse shots ensures, between the two characters, the interchangeability necessary to their future substitution. It is here that Norman's family romance is presented, in the deceptive form in which it has been restructured by his desire, by the truth of his delirium,¹⁰ thus echoing the more disparate

elements of Sam's and Marion's family romances, scattered throughout their dialogue in the hotel room. Thus, the two mental forms are brought together by similarity and exclusion: Marion grows aware of her own derangement because of the much more absolute derangement she senses in Norman. Their differential assimilation is concentrated in a metaphor with endless ramifications. "*Norman*: You—you eat like a bird." The metaphor is no sooner spoken than it is denied. "Anyway, I hear the expression 'eats like a bird'—...it—it's really a fals-fals-fals-falsity. Because birds really eat a tremendous lot."¹¹ Marion has to be a bird, in order to be constituted as a body potentially similar to that of Norman's mother, object of his desire, stuffed just like the birds who survey their exchange. But Marion cannot really be a bird, because the bird's "psychotic" appetite has been reserved for Norman, as the body transformed into the mother's body (even if, by a remarkable reversal, Norman eats nothing during the entire scene: "It's all for you. I'm not hungry.").

The reception room scene is meticulously organized to lead up to the murder scene. After an opening shot during which Norman appears amidst the stuffed birds disposed about the room, there are four shots showing Marion, standing, in alternation with the birds: the order of these shots (bird *a*—Marion—bird *b*—Marion) denotes her feeling that she is seen by the birds as much as she sees them, and that this disturbs her. After a repetition of shot 1 (Norman standing), there is a shot showing Norman and Marion together, seated on either side of a tray of food prepared by Norman. Then a classical alternation is established, dividing the shot between the two characters to distribute their dialogue. At the same time, a formal opposition emphasizes the fact that Norman, in this second alternation, has come to occupy, with respect to Marion, the place of the birds. In the various ways in which Norman is framed, he is associated with the outstretched beaks and widespread wings of one or several of the stuffed birds. Conversely, Marion is defined successively in two framings: she is beneath an oval painting whose theme was clearly visible during the second bird shot of the preceding alternation. The painting distinctly shows a band of angels, or, more precisely, a group of three women in which the central figure seems to be rising up to heaven, wings outspread. Next to the painting, in the same shot, the menacing shadow of a crow is projected onto the wall, penetrating the picture like a knifeblade or a penis. It is this complex whole that rivets Marion's attention, then splits apart when she takes her seat beneath the painting and becomes—through a double, metaphorical-metonymical inflection—defined by it, just as Norman is later emblematically defined by the birds. Thus the differential assimilation is continued: Marion, angel-woman-bird; Norman,

116 bird-fetish-murderer. And thus is prefigured, in the intertwined motifs of alternation, the aggression of which she is soon to be the object (announced, when she rises, half concealing the painting, by the black beak of the crow that reappears inside the frame).

A few shots later, the alternation between Norman and Marion recommences, this time through an apparatus that mimics the cinematographic apparatus itself. Norman is concealed, significantly, by a painting which prefigures the effect he is to produce: *Suzanne and the Elders*, virtually at the moment of the rape. Beneath the painting is a large hole that reveals, in the wall itself, the tiny luminous hole to which Norman puts his eye, creating—just like the projector's beam—an image which is for us virtual and for him almost real: Marion undressing, once again in the proximity of two birds, the portraits hanging on the wall of her bedroom near the bathroom door. The alternation then continues, obsessively marking the insert of the bulging eyeball, and shifting from the relationship between shots to the relationship between segments (or subsegments).

The next double series of shots, postponing voyeurism, intensifies it to the extreme:

a) Norman, under the influence of what he has seen, goes back to shut himself up in the house in order to imagine what will happen next—or better yet, what will happen metaphorically for him, given the premises that catalyze his desire.

b) Marion, in her room, soon gets into the shower: the spectator, by this advance intrusion, is witness to the scene for which Norman's obsession has prepared the way.

The moment of the murder marks the invasion by the subject (hero and spectator together) of the constituted image of his phantasy. Here, alternation must be abandoned; it is ruptured by the brutal inscription on the image of the living body-knife-bird of Norman-the mother, the reiterated fragmentation of Marion's body, the insert of her mouth agape in a horrendous scream and that of the dead eye that answers—at the opposite extreme of this very long fragment—the bulging eye of Norman given over to the inordinate desire of the scopic drive.

VII.

That only men are subjects of psychosis (or that women are psychotic only by default, or by reflection) here implies, above all, something else: that only men are subjects of perversion (here and elsewhere, given a certain regime of fiction, and a certain order of civilization).

It should be recalled that the manner in which psychosis and perversion can both be defined—although not in the same way—is by

their difference from neurosis, through their common allegiance to the wishes of the Id: the former, as has been seen, by its indulgence in a form of delirious reconstruction, through an infinitely more radical loss of reality than in neurosis, implying a lesser subservience to repressive mechanisms; the latter, in the sense of the famous formula: neurosis is “the negative of perversion.” Though it must not be taken literally—as its reversal (perversion is the negative of neurosis) would tend to define perversion as nothing but the raw manifestation of infantile desire—Freud’s formula does imply, however, that perversion provides a more direct access to the object of the drive, according to its own defense mechanisms (denial of reality, splitting of the Ego), which in some ways link it to those of psychosis.¹²

More specifically, it can be seen how this twofold difference is articulated here with respect to the inscription of the scopical drive and its destiny. To go back to the beginning of the film: there is the first, continuous shot during which the camera wanders down from a high-angle over the rooftops of a city, progressively closing in on a window with half-raised blinds, then going beneath these blinds to reveal, in a bedroom, a couple that has just been making love. Thus, from the start, emphasis is placed on the voyeuristic position, which deliberately constitutes the position of enunciation.¹³ It is highly remarkable that this opening shot, quite common in Hitchcock’s films (cf. *Shadow of a Doubt*), is especially reminiscent of *Rope*, in which the first interminable shot focuses—having passed through a similar window/screen—on the cold fury of a murder.¹⁴ In this interplay of forms based on an endless interchangeability between murder and the sexual act (cf., for example, the scene of the kiss in the train in *North by Northwest*),¹⁵ it is clearly the “unseen” of the primal scene in the hotel room which, at the level of the enunciating instance itself (Hitchcock-the camera), is displaced from neurosis to psychosis, from the hotel room to the motel room.

Thus, Norman obviously comes to occupy, with respect to Marion, the place of Sam (whence the resemblance, for some striking, between Sam and Norman, particularly during the scene of their confrontation across the counter in the motel office).¹⁶ However, the substitution occurs at the price of a displacement, imputable to the respective identifications between Hitchcock and the two male characters. In the first scene, the camera almost always remains at a distance from Sam: he is held, like Marion, and usually with her, within the frame, that is, within the neurotic field that the two of them circumscribe. An essentially diegetic identification is thus set up (for the male spectator, who is *primarily* addressed), at the level of the sexual possession of which Marion has been the object, when Sam renews his

Conversely, in the shots preceding the shower scene, the camera reduces to an extreme degree the unforeseeable effect of the distance separating it from what is being filmed: it virtually coincides with the insert of Norman's bulging eye, due to the metaphor of the apparatus thus constituted. This is the point of maximal identification between the character and the instance of the *mise en scène*; it can only be surpassed by its own excess, when the eye-camera becomes a body-knife, entering the field of its object and attempting in vain to coincide with it.

However, in order to go from one man to another, and from one position to another, the camera must also embody the woman and adopt her look, conserving a strong identification—diegetic, of course, but more specifically specular, determined by the organization of the point of view—with the subject it has taken as its object. (The latter can be maintained in a position of fundamental subjection through a series of carefully planned relays—the policemen, the service station attendant—that reiterate the question of which she has been the object from the start.) In conformity with its basic path, that of perverse structuration, the transformation from neurosis to psychosis is brought about by woman, who is both its foundation and its indispensable form.

This explains the lengthiness of the first half of the first movement, organized around theft and escape. It also explains the systematic series of shot-reverse shots which mark Marion's itinerary up until the moment of blindness (a mixture of fatigue and hypnosis) that causes her to turn off the wet highway and head for the motel. It explains, finally, the resumption and redoubling of these shots as a preparation for the moment of reversal, during the confrontation between Marion and Norman. In this manner, the diegesis participates directly in the aggressive potential, carried to an extreme by the reciprocity of the looks in the alternation of shot-reverse shots. The effects of this cinematographic code par excellence evoke the structure of the cinematographic apparatus, and thereby of the primitive apparatus it imitates, namely the mirror wherein the subject structures himself, through a mode of narcissistic identification of which aggressivity is an indelible component.¹⁸ However, this reference only makes sense—here very specifically (as in all of Hitchcock's films, and classical cinema in general, particularly American)—within the global system in which it has been constructed, that is, a system in which the aggressive element can never be separated from the inflection it receives from sexual difference, and the attribution of this difference to the signifier that governs it. In other words, it is directed from the man towards the woman, and that difference which appears due to woman is nothing but the mirror-effect

of the narcissistic doubling that makes possible the constitution of the male subject through the woman's body, ordered by a double play of differentiated identity, based on an effect of imaginary projection subjected to the constitutive pressure of a symbolic determination.¹⁹

Between man and woman, through woman's look as appropriated by the camera, this mirror- or doubling-effect (hence also one of denial and splitting) serves to structure the male subject as the subject of a scopic drive, that is to say, a subject who imaginarily attributes to woman the lack he himself has been assigned, in response to the anxiety created by the phantasized threat of this lack within his own body. This is the classical dialectic—as described by Freud and Lacan—of the phallus and castration; its implications with respect to perversion (the conjugated motifs of voyeurism and fetishism) have been astutely analyzed by Guy Rosolato.²⁰ Lacan refers this dialectic, particularly as regards the scopic drive, to the lack—unevenly divided between the two sexes—of the signifier that structures it; it is this signifier, castration, which determines “the gaze as *objet a*.”²¹ In a different perspective, the same dialectic has been relativized by Luce Irigaray, who denounces the fact that in men (that is, in Sam, Norman, Hitchcock, Freud, Lacan, the subject writing these lines in an attempt to fissure the system that holds him) “the scopic drive is predominant.”²²

This is why, theoretically, there are no women fetishists;²³ nor even, more broadly speaking, women perverts: either because, in psychological terms, “perverse” as applied to women connotes perversity rather than perversion, or because theory—elaborated or directed by men—has avoided acknowledging perversions in women, not having discovered *perversion* itself.

This explains the fact that Norman's psychosis, his inordinate object-desire that rushes headlong into murder, is entirely structured by a fetishistic aim carried to the point of madness. Psychoanalytically, it might be said, Norman is a collage (which neither confirms nor denies his clinical possibilities, which are not in question—simply because, for me, that is not the question). He seeks to construct a chain in which the excessiveness of the psychotic-perverse desire of the male subject can be structured—from the man to the camera, his true measure—during the scene where he establishes his presence at a distance, fascinated, in vertiginous mastery. This chain may be written: phallus-bird-fetish-mother-eye-knife-camera. A terrifying play on words (suggested, rather than made explicit, in the film) connects this chain to the omnipotence of infantile desire turned towards death: *Mommy*, *mummy*:²⁴ the mother's body, fetishized to death, so to speak, becomes the body that murders, in keeping with the desire awakened in the eye of the subject possessed by it. Through the incredible incorporation of a metaphor-

120 become-reality, Norman's fascinated look carries within it the phallus immemorially attributed to the mother. But he can acknowledge it in himself only on condition that he ceaselessly encounter it in his mirror-image, namely in the body/look of woman (which engenders the mirage), and as an absolute threat to which he must respond; otherwise, it is his own body that will desert him. Such (to complete the psychiatrist's speech) might be the motivations behind the genealogy of the case: the reiterative passage from the former murder (that of the mother) to the murder of Marion of which Norman-the mother is the agent, emphasizing in both cases, given an original identificatory phantasy, the literally impossible desire for possession and fusion that is at stake.

This allows us to describe the distribution of the three terms (psychosis, neurosis, perversion) within the logic of the process of enunciation. These terms define the primordial relationship between the two scenes which most closely circumscribe this process (the hotel and the motel), through a "breathing-space" during which the subject is presented as such. The possessive form used in the credits—"Alfred Hitchcock's *Psycho*"—is a mark of enunciation which may be said to have a double meaning: this film belongs to me; this psychosis is mine, or would be mine if . . . if it weren't, precisely, for this film, which both involves me in and frees me from psychosis, positioning me elsewhere. A special lettering effect (something like the bulging eye during the credits of *Vertigo*) contributes to the singularization of this relatively common signifying arrangement: a vibrato twice causes the center of the letters to shift back and forth, first for the title *Psycho*, and then for the name in the final enunciation: "Directed by Alfred Hitchcock." In addition, the opening scene immediately reiterates the interplay of black and white lines that had striated the credits from top to bottom: the camera must pass under Venetian blinds to enter the room at the end of its movement, and it is on the background of these horizontal lines, in the second half of the scene, that Sam and Marion are seen in reverse shot, separately or together. Thus, by displacement and metaphor, what is inscribed in this space communicates an implied relationship between the title and the name.

In the first scene, the camera's power is intrinsically expressed by the bird's-eye view of the city and its rooftops, then emphasized by its concentration on the voyeuristic point of reference: the couple in the bedroom after love-making. The "after" is important, since, in a sense, the camera intervenes in place of what happens between man and woman at the literally mythical level of the primal scene: it is a continually withdrawing instance, collecting—at the purified level of vicariousness—what is fundamentally perverse and psychotic, given the

logic of this perspective, in man's desire for woman, even within the neurotic configuration that is its most common destiny. The camera becomes, it might be said, the eye-phallus, projected and reprojected from one sex to the other, but on the basis of a signifying privilege assigned to only one sex, transforms the camera into pure eye, look, dissociated from the scene, in proportion to the lack of the phallus of which it circumscribes the representation so that—and because—it is represented in it.²⁵ It is this dialectic, in slightly different terms, that emerges during the second scene, through a temporal actualization: "that which may not be seen" seeks to show itself, to break into awareness (into reality), but displaced from the act. The camera must still, obviously, remain outside its object. Yet it is also doubly inscribed within it, as has been seen: firstly by the mediation of the apparatus set up around Norman, and secondly through the invasion, by the subject of the apparatus, of the tableau of his own vision. From its perverse situation, already enhanced by an identification with the subject of the diegesis, the camera thus fully assumes the psychotic function that was potentially circumscribed during the first scene. However, it can of course attain only a more extreme perversion, since it is filming its metaphorical invasion of its own field. It thus reaffirms all the more strongly, by its very division, the unforeseeable effects of distance, lack and denial that make it up—everything that psychosis (Norman-the camera) is at that very moment attempting to exorcize by presenting as real, through a rape ending in murder, the imaginary and ungraspable relation of the primal scene.

Within this configuration, one thing seems to me to be essential, namely that it is through woman's pleasure (*jouissance*) that the perverse projection and psychotic inscription are carried out (just as it is through her actions, her body, her look, that the film moves from one scene to the next). The emphasis on Marion's pleasure in the shower goes well beyond all diegetic motivation: close-up shots of her naked body alternate with shots of gushing water; she leans into the stream, opens her mouth, smiles, and closes her eyes in a rapture that is made all the more intense because it contrasts with the horror that is to come, but also because the two are linked together. By a subtle reversal, the pleasure that Marion did not show in the opening love scene at last appears. However, the pleasure is for herself (even if it can only be so for the camera, because of the image-nature assigned to her by the camera); it takes the form of narcissistic intimacy which poses, for men, the question of sexual pleasure itself, with woman's body instituted as its mythical site. The masculine subject can accept the image of woman's pleasure only on condition that, having constructed it, he may inscribe himself and recognize himself within it, and thus reappropriate

VIII.

Briefly, to resume and strengthen what has been said by considering several points in a spiral-like movement, i.e. together, as a text does whenever one tries to make it appear as what it is, that is to say, as what it becomes, virtually, always in analysis: a *volume*.

1. The first scene(s) is (are) programmed as a matrix whose elements are distributed throughout the whole text by effects of dispersal, rebound and repetition. This is one of the laws of classical film (see, in particular, the analyses of Thierry Kuntzel).²⁷ In *Psycho*, this process is at first carried out at a very general level. The first scene, through the shift in the screenplay, primarily serves as a preparation for the succession of scenes between Marion and Norman: their tête-à-tête in the reception room, the series of shots setting up Norman as apparatus, the murder in the shower. From this is derived, at the end, the scene with the psychiatrist, which resolves not only the enigma, but the (psychic) mystery of the murder: this final scene only replies to the first one at the price of the initial displacement caused by the shift in the screenplay.

There is also, however, the way in which the first scene inaugurates the sequence of bedrooms: the motel rooms, Marion's room, Arbogast's room (suggested), Sam and Lila's room, and thence, at the end of the third movement, the intrusion into the bedrooms of the house, especially Norman's and the mother's, under Lila's discovering look.

More subtly, there is a thread which leads from the first shot, to Norman as apparatus, to the next-to-last shot. Norman-the mother is seen in a medium shot against the naked wall of his cell, smiling, while on his face is gradually superimposed the skull which will make of him, irremediably, the mother. Her voice is heard: "I hope that they are watching, they will see, they will see and they will say, 'Why she wouldn't even harm a fly.'" ²⁸ This circular play on words goes from the fly to the bird, to the body-fetish of Norman-the mother. But it goes further still: to the omnipotence of the scopoc drive. Norman's words are addressed to all the guardians of the law (policemen, judges, psychiatrist), presumably gathered on the other side of the door and peering at him through the keyhole. However, through them, his words are addressed to the spectator, who is trapped in the mirror by Norman's eyes, staring right into the camera as though to conjure away the power it exerts. The spectator is thus confronted, from within the shot itself, with the "non-authorized scopophilia" that places cine-

matic voyeurism “in the direct lineage of the primal scene.”²⁹ Thus, all of the opening shots have been condensed into the body-look of Norman-the mother, revealing the reflective structure of the apparatus, before the final shot, with an ultimate effect of resolution, brings the film to its close (in a single sweep, using a very long dissolve to link the last and next-to-last shots through the superimposition of the skull). In this way, two screenplays intermingle: male (Sam, Norman, and—in both—Hitchcock) and female (Marion, the mother); and the end, after a monstrous detour, replies to the beginning. Marion’s dead body reappears in the white car dragged from the marsh only because it has been, from the beginning, the object of the conjugated desire of a man and the camera.

2. The apparatus is therefore present in the film, though not—as in *Rear Window*—by a mirror effect. Here, a certain rhyming effect of two images strikes me; firstly, on the roadside at dawn, the close-up of the policeman coming upon Marion asleep in her car; and secondly, in the cellar, the close-up of the mother’s skeleton. The latter is seen twice, once when Lila puts her hand on Mrs. Bates’s shoulder and the draped skeleton slowly swings around toward her, and again at the end of the segment, after Norman’s intrusion. There is a similarity between these two faces, sustained by a striking reversal: the eyes have disappeared; in the second case they are nothing but hollow sockets, and in the first they are totally hidden by dark glasses. This is a way of signifying, by its very absence, the unbearably excessive nature of the look. The dark glasses especially (like Mitch’s binoculars in *The Birds*) suggest a metaphor of the photographic lens: super-vision of the law, symbolized by its representative; excess of the symbolic itself, which triumphs at the end “in the prolixity of the psychiatrist.”³⁰ Film, both as discourse and as an institution, is subject to an order that is marked by the monolithic power of its ruling signifier. However, this super-vision is also that of disorder, the breaking of the law, of which fetishistic psychosis is the most inordinate form. Moreover, the signifier is perpetually imaginary, subject to denial and splitting. The hollow eye-sockets of the mother are the verso of an apparatus whose recto is the policeman’s dark glasses. There is an endless circularity between desire and the law, both of which, taken to an extreme, inspire terror (in Marion, in Lila).

Here, I cannot resist associating more or less freely. When Lila enters the cellar she sees, from behind, a woman seated. In the foreground to the right, in the upper part of the frame, there is an electric lightbulb so alive, so enormous, and disposed in such a manner that it seemed to me—at first sight and at each successive viewing, despite critical distance—to simulate a spherical screen, casting a blinding light onto the brick wall across from Mrs. Bates. The mother occupies, in this

124 virtual image, the place of the spectator, thus evoking the real spectator, and even more so his mirror image (the fetish inhabited by the death wish) when she looks at him directly during the next two close-up shots. This is particularly true the second time, when Lila's terror causes her to knock against the lightbulb, making it swing back and forth. The vacillation in the lighting thus produced is repeated and amplified later (when Norman bursts in, unmasked and overcome by Sam): the skull seems to be animated by this vibration—this play of lights and shadows which also designates the cinema itself.

Following this, representation dissolves into the very image of the law (a metaphorical reappearance of the policeman): a general shot of the courthouse introduces the psychiatrist's speech.

3. That everything in *Psycho* seems immediately doubled must be seen as the effect—with repercussions in concentric waves down to the micro-systematic level of the smallest signifying units—of the two main rhetorical axes that organize the film, namely its ternary composition and its two screenplays. Other of Hitchcock's films also manifest, by their very structure, the specific pressure of the doubling process that underlies all his films: *Shadow of a Doubt*, with the determining superimposition of the uncle's and niece's names (Charlie); *Strangers on a Train*, with the exchange of murders; *Vertigo*, with the mirror-effect of the double heroine (Madeleine-Judy). However, this doubling process is, so to speak, exacerbated in *Psycho* by the crisscross effects of substitution, division and echo among characters. The first couple, Sam and Marion, engenders the second, Norman and Marion: Norman has thus taken the place of Sam. Yet he has actually, diegetically speaking, taken the place of Marion, given the mirror dialectic between the sexes and their psychic structurations. Lila's appearance at the beginning of the second movement causes this network of transformations to double back on itself: she represents the return of the indispensable heroine, Marion's reappearance (like Judy's in *Vertigo*) in the form of her sister. Thus, the film could be said to be organized in yet another way with respect to woman's body-look, because of the long sequence taking Lila from the motel to the cellar where she discovers—with an absolute horror that obviously recalls that of Marion in the shower—the stuffed body of the mother. Thus the diegetic couple disjoined at the end of the first segment is reconstituted as a shadow: Sam and Lila, pretending to be married—as Sam and Marion were intended to be—approach the motel where Marion first met Norman on the path that was supposed to lead her to Sam. The function of this shadow-couple reveals in an exemplary way, through repetition and mimed (undermined) resolution, the deep structural subversion of sameness that is here carried out.

4. To conclude, we might point out the constellation of signifiers

that disseminate and recenter the differential doubling between men and women to which the fiction is continually and completely subjected.

○ *Norman-Marion*: Christian names in mirror-relation to one another, interchangeable but for a single phoneme (Marion was chosen instead of the Mary of Bloch's novel).

○ *Nor-man*: he who is neither woman . . . nor man, since he can be one in the place of the other, or rather one and the other, one within the other.

○ *Marie Samuels*: the name used by Marion to sign the motel register, derived from Sam's first name.

○ *Phoenix* (superimposed on the first shot to situate the action): again, a bird; the bird that dies only in order to be transformed (as is here the case, through murder, of one character, one sex, one story) into another. In fact, there is a double metamorphosis: a diegetic one (Marion becoming Norman) and a formative one (Norman becoming a living bird-mother) which renders possible the former.

Crane: Marion's last name; once again a bird's name. It marks her body with the signifier that appears, to Norman, as a lack or an excess. But the word "crane" also means something else: the machine that embodies above all others, in the image-taking apparatus, the omniscient power of the look, what might be called the bird's-eye view. This is to say, once again, but here with an element of humor, that the camera becomes one with woman's body, and that in this sense it is itself the fetish, adopting the forms of the bird and of Norman-the mother, going through the whole circuit of the fiction, only to be immediately acknowledged as the enunciating index, at the level of the apparatus that makes fiction possible.

Whence, indissolubly, here, it can be said of film and cinema, that they are the very institution of perversion.

Translated by Nancy Huston

NOTES

1. François Truffaut, *Hitchcock* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 206.

2. Cf., on the relationship between the film and the original narrative, James Naremore, *Filmguide to Psycho*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 23-24, 33-34. I found in this short essay, after

126 having written a first, summary version of the present article ("Psycho," *Dossiers du Cinéma, Films II* (Paris: Casterman, 1972), several observations along the same lines as my analysis. Some of the elements organized around Marion during the first section of the narrative appear, in Bloch's novel, as mental flashbacks to scenes that comprise, in Hitchcock's film, the second section.

3. Truffaut, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

4. Syntagmatic change, punctuation, diegetic unity. Cf. Christian Metz, "Ponctuations et démarcations dans le film de diégèse," *Essais sur la signification au cinéma*, II (Paris: Klincksieck, 1972), pp. 126-128. Cf. also on this point my study of Minnelli's *Gigi*, "To Analyze, To Segment," *Quarterly Review of Film Studies*, 1, No. 3 (August 1976).

5. Sheriff Chambers expresses this in two sentences, the second of which closes the scene on a note of horror: "Norman Bates's mother has been dead and buried in Greenlawn Cemetery for the past ten years." "Well, if that woman up there is Mrs. Bates, who's that woman buried out in Greenlawn Cemetery?" Richard Anobile, ed. *Psycho* (New York: Avon, 1975), pp. 193, 195.

6. S. Freud, "Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis" (1904), *Complete Works*, Standard Edition, XIX.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

8. *Marion*: Oh, Sam, I hate having to be with you in a place like this.
Sam: I've heard of married couples who deliberately spend an occasional night in a cheap hotel. They say it's very exciting.
Marion: Oh, when you're married you can do a lot of things deliberately.
Sam: You sure talk like a girl who's been married.
Marion: Sam, this is the last time.
Sam: Yeah? For what?
Marion: For this. For meeting you in secret—so we can be secretive. You come down here on those business trips and we steal lunch hours and—Oh, Sam, I wish you wouldn't even come. . . .
Sam: I sweat to pay off my father's debts and he's in his grave. I sweat to pay my ex-wife's alimony, and she's—living on the other side of the world somewhere!
Marion: I pay, too. They also pay who meet in hotel rooms.
Sam: A couple of years and—the debts will be paid off and—if she

ever remarries, the alimony stops and—

Marion: I haven't even been married once yet!

Sam: Yeah, but when you do you'll swing!

Marion: Sam, let's get married!

Anobile, op. cit. pp. 15-16, 19-20.

9. It might be added, for the pleasure of the "intertext," that the amount of money stolen by Marion (\$40,000) is the same as the amount spent by Mark, in *Marnie*, on the wedding ring he offers Marnie. Moreover, this money was intended by the millionaire, who shows it off to Marion, for the purchase of a house as a wedding gift to his daughter.

10. *Norman's version*: Father's death when he was five. Some years later, his mother falls madly in love with a man who encourages her to build the motel. When he dies, the mother goes crazy.

Sheriff's version (emergence of the mystery in the middle of the third movement): Norman poisons the lover. The mother, in turn, poisons herself.

Psychiatrist's version (solution of the mystery): Norman poisons the lover and his mother.

11. Anobile, op. cit., p. 77.

12. J. Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), p. 309.

13. Hitchcock: "It also allows the viewer to become a Peeping Tom." Truffaut, op. cit., p. 204.

14. No contradiction is implied by the fact that in *Rope* it is a man who is being killed. Men, too, are killed in Hitchcock's films—and often—in more or less direct or displaced reference to the murder of the father. In *Rope*, the object of the murder may also be referred, in a complementary manner, to the virtually manifest homosexuality of the two murderers.

15. Cf. my analysis, "Le blocage symbolique," *Communications*, No. 23 (1975), pp. 251-256.

16. Cf. Naremore, op. cit., p. 66.

17. *Sam*: We could laze around here a while longer.

Marion: Checking out time is three p.m. Motels of this sort—are

not interested in you when you come in, but when your time is up—”

Anobile, op. cit., p. 15.

18. Jacqueline Rose, “Paranoia and the Film System,” *Screen*, 17, No. 4 (Winter 1976-77).

19. Cf., for an historical perspective on the symbolic constitution of the male subject, my study “Un jour, la castration,” *Alexandre Dumas, L’Arc*, No. 71 (1978).

20. Cf. in particular “Perversions sexuelles,” *Encyclopédie Médico-chirurgicale* (Paris: 1968), 37392 CIO, pp. 8-9.

21. Jacques Lacan, *Les Quatre Concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, (Paris: Seuil, 1973). English translation by Alan Sheridan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1977).

22. “Misère de la psychanalyse,” *Critique*, No. 365 (October 1977), p. 900. Cf. also *Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un* (Paris: Minuit, 1977), p. 25.

23. Rosolato: “This perversion is practiced exclusively by men,” *Encyclopédie Médico-chirurgicale*, op. cit., p. 9.

24. I owe this to the friendship of Thierry Kuntzel.

25. On the eye-phallus relationship, cf. Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, op. cit., pp. 101-104.

26. *Marnie*, in this regard, deals with the reappropriation of the image, whereas *Psycho* deals with its destruction. Cf. my article “Hitchcock, The Enunciator,” *Camera Obscura*, No. 2 (1977).

27. “Le travail du film, 1,” *Communications*, No. 19 (1972); English translation, *Enclitic*, 2, No. 1 (1978) pp. 39-64. “Le travail du film, 2,” *Communications*, No. 25 (1975); English translation, *Camera Obscura/5* (forthcoming). cf. also my article “Hitchcock, The Enunciator,” op. cit., and similar themes in my articles “Les Oiseaux: analyse d’une séquence,” *Cahiers du Cinema*, No. 216 (October 1969), p. 38; “Le blocage symbolique,” op.cit., p. 349; “To Analyse, To Segment,” op. cit.

28. Anobile, op. cit., p. 255.

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29. Christian Metz, "Le signifiant imaginaire," *Communications* No. 23 (1975), p. 45. English translation, *Screen*, 16, No. 2 (Summer 1975), pp. 14-76.

30. Roger Dadoun, in the few suggestive lines devoted to *Psycho* in "Le fétichisme dans le film d'horreur," *Objets du fétichisme, Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse*, No. 2 (Autumn 1970), p. 238.





